It appears that you would hold to some form of’reductionism’ or maybe even ‘property-dualism’ (i.e. the mental supervenes upon the physical when the underlying physical structure is arranged to a certain complexity [like a dot matrix making a picture] so that mental properties can ‘emerge’ in a physical substance).

While I would disagree with this position, (I am not a materialist),your position (if I have correctly identified it) holds an advantage over Pinker’s in relation to ethics. As a matter of fact, I think Pinker is a strict physicalist and simply ignores the problem of phenomenological perception.

Again, the bottom line of Pinker’s Time article is that he is seeking to derive an ethical position (an ‘ought’) from a mere description of the human organism (an ‘is’). This is a logical fallacy and is just not possible (unless you totally redefine ethics).

Thanks for the comment lichanos! Stop by anytime!

Is the might oak the SAME as the acorn? Is the OAK potentially IN the acorn? There is an unbroken continuum of existence from acorn to oak. Since one inevitably leads to the other, can we not equate them?

This is the simple, I think simplistic materialism, Darwinian position. It says, “altruism has survival value – evolution selects for features with survival value – ergo, human altruism is SIMPLY a selected biological feature.”

Just because something has something as its origin and root doesn’t mean that that origin and root explains in toto the result. Yes, our emotions and ethics have roots in Darwinian selection over millions of years – I think this is so. Still, we have language and a symbolic realm – there is more to it now.

I would make a similar argument against Pinkers tool simple materialism. I AM a materialist – but physicality has a way of becoming mentality.

A foundational basis for morality is exactly what Pinker is arguing for. This can even be seen in the brief snippet of his Time article which I quoted in my post. As a matter of fact, I would say that, besides his theory of language development (which is quite interesting by the way), Pinker’s materialistic ethical theory is probably his most well-known position.

As to a biological basis for moral intuition…I’m not sure. I guess it depends on how you define “morality”. I suppose that it’s possible that God could have encoded a moral sensibility into our DNA or something. Indeed, this would be a wonderful way to explain things like sociopathic behavior. However, this theory still provides a metaphysical basis for morality (divine intervention).

However, if “morality” is equated with instinctual social behavior (like ants, bees, herd mammals, etc.), then I would say that we have left the realm of ethics all together. As I argued in my post, our biological constitution may explain why we behave in a certain way (declarative statements), but it cannot tell us how we ought to behave (imperative statements).

I completely agree with you. My argument against Pinker’s ethical theory is in no way an argument against materialism (although I am indeed ideologically opposed to materialism). Neither am I arguing that Pinker is an unethical person (I’m quite sure that he is a moral man). I’m simply pointing out that Pinker’s ethical theory is logically fallacious (an ontological category error to be exact).

Besides this, Pinker, himself, commits the genetic fallacy in his argument against moral realism (NY Times article). Even if human moral intuition were to have evolved according to natural processes, this does not invalidate moral realism at all.

I’m quite willing to acknowledge, as well, that there are other materialistic-friendly ethical theories that do not fall prey to Pinker’s fallacy (utilitarianism for example). Although I do not hold to them myself. However, that is another post entirely

Stop by anytime!

Supposing that’s true, it in now way affects the truth or falsehood of materialism. (If you imagine it does, then you engage in the fallacy known as appeal to consequences.)